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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
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Woodcock Washburn Kurtz Mackiewicz & Norris 46th Floor One Liberty Place Philadelphia, PA 19103				
EXAMINER				
MAL, TRI M				
ART UNIT		PAPER NUMBER		
3781				
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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/857,145

Applicant(s)

FIELDS, BRIAN

Examiner

Tri M. Mai

Art Unit

3781

Period for Reply
-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☐ Responsive to communication(s) filed on ____.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-10 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) ____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) ____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-10 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) ____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) ____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on ____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. ____.
 - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date ____.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date ____.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: ____

1. Claims 1-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by Clarke, III. Clarke, III teaches a container having a center panel that can be made with various sizes (col. 2, line 24), and an area of less than .5 square inches. Although Clark, III does not mention the ratio aspect between 1.3 and 1.7. Base on the prior art cited, it is recognized in the art that the LOE openings generally has an aspect ratio of 1.49. Since the diameter is a factor of the area measurement, the diameter of Clarke III would inherent meet the claimed limitation as well.
2. Claims 1-10 are again rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Clarke, III in view of Carnaudmetal (WO9637414), and further in view of either Schmalbach (EP432659), or the admitted prior art. Clarke, III teaches a container having a center panel that can be made with various sizes (col. 2, line 24), and an area of less than .5 square inches. Clarke, III meets all claimed limitations except for the diameter of the center panel being less than 1.835 inches and the ratio aspect between 1.3 and 1.7. Carnaudmetal teaches that it is known in the art to provide various diameters for a center panel (Table 6). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide the diameter of the center panel being less than 1.835 in Clarke, III as taught by Carnaudmetal to provide the desired end wall for the container.

With respect to the opening ratio, Schmalbach teaches that it is known in the art to provide an opening about 1.5 (31mm/20mm about the opening in Fig. 1). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide the opening with a ratio about 1.5 in Clarke, III as taught by Schmalbach to provide the desired opening for the container.

Furthermore, the specification discloses an opening with a ratio about 1.47 (page 8, line 13). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide an opening with a

ratio about 1.5 in Clarke, III as taught by the admitted prior art to provide the desired opening for the container.

Even to the degree it is argued that the flow rate is not being taught by the applied references as set forth above. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method design of such product. If the product in is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different design process.

3. Claims 1-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over either Schmalbach (EP432659) or the admitted prior art in view of Clarke, III, and further in view Carnaudmetal (WO9637414). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the standard size openings of less than .5 square inches in opening by Schamlbach or the admitted prior art as taught by Clarke, III to provide the desired opening

Carnaudmetal teaches that it is known in the art to provide various diameters for a center panel (Table 6). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide the diameter of the center panel being less than 1.835 to provide the desired end wall for the container.

With respect to the opening ratio, Schmalbach teaches that it is known in the art to provide an opening about 1.5 (31mm/20mm about the opening in Fig. 1). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide the opening with a ratio about 1.5 in Clarke, III as taught by Schmalbach to provide the desired opening for the container.

Furthermore, the specification discloses an opening with a ratio about 1.47 (page 8, line 13). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide an opening with a

ratio about 1.5 in Clarke, III as taught by the admitted prior art to provide the desired opening for the container.

Even to the degree it is argued that the flow rate is not being taught by the applied references as set forth above. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method design of such product. If the product in is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different design process. As noted in the previous Office Action, the examiner doesn't see any unexpected result coming from the test results as shown in Fig. 3, note that the flow rate indicative of B is nothing more than a normal deviation as compared from the two prior art curve. In other words, the data shown in Fig. 3 does not show any unexpected result. Furthermore, applicant fails to demonstrate the criticality of a claimed range as how are the openings in Clark III and EP 432659 perform as compared to the opening as claimed.

4. Applicant is noted of the following sections from the MPEP:

716.02 Allegations of Unexpected Results

Any differences between the claimed invention and the prior art may be expected to result in some differences in properties. The issue is whether the properties differ to such an extent that the difference is really unexpected. In *re Merck & Co.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (differences in sedative and anticholinergic effects between prior art and claimed antidepressants were not unexpected). In *re Waymouth*, 499 F.2d 1273, 1276, 182 USPQ 290, 293 (CCPA 1974), the court held that unexpected results for a claimed range as compared with the range disclosed in the prior art had been shown by a demonstration of "a marked improvement, over the results achieved under other ratios, as to be classified as a difference in kind, rather than one of degree." Compare *In re Wagner*, 371 F.2d 877, 884, 152 USPQ 552, 560 (CCPA 1967) (differences in properties cannot be disregarded on the ground they are differences in degree rather than in kind); *Ex parte Gelles*, 22 USPQ2d 1318, 1319 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) ("we generally consider a discussion of results in terms of differences in degree' as compared to differences in kind' . . . to have very little meaning in a relevant legal sense").

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716.02(a) [R-2] Evidence Must Show Unexpected Results**>I. < GREATER THAN EXPECTED RESULTS ARE EVIDENCE OF NONOBVIOUSNESS**

“A greater than expected result is an evidentiary factor pertinent to the legal conclusion of obviousness ... of the claims at issue.” In re Corkill, 711 F.2d 1496, 226 USPQ 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Corkhill, the claimed combination showed an additive result when a diminished result would have been expected. This result was persuasive of nonobviousness even though the result was equal to that of one component alone. Evidence of a greater than expected result may also be shown by demonstrating an effect which is greater than the sum of each of the effects taken separately (i.e., demonstrating “synergism”). Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 10 USPQ2d 1843 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989). However, a greater than additive effect is not necessarily sufficient to overcome a prima facie case of obviousness because such an effect can either be expected or unexpected. **Applicants must further show that the results were greater than those which would have been expected from the prior art to an unobvious extent, and that the results are of a significant, practical advantage.** Ex parte The NutraSweet Co., 19 USPQ2d 1586 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1991) (Evidence showing greater than additive sweetness resulting from the claimed mixture of saccharin and L-aspartyl-L-phenylalanine was not sufficient to outweigh the evidence of obviousness because the teachings of the prior art lead to a general expectation of greater than additive sweetening effects when using mixtures of synthetic sweeteners.).

>II. < SUPERIORITY OF A PROPERTY SHARED WITH THE PRIOR ART IS EVIDENCE OF NONOBVIOUSNESS

Evidence of unobvious or unexpected advantageous properties, such as **superiority in a property the claimed compound shares with the prior art, can rebut prima facie obviousness.** “Evidence that a compound is unexpectedly superior in one of a spectrum of common properties . . . can be enough to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.” No set number of examples of superiority is required. In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646, 2USPQ2d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Evidence showing that the claimed herbicidal compound was more effective than the closest prior art compound in controlling quackgrass and yellow nutsedge weeds in corn and soybean crops was sufficient to overcome the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103, even though the specification indicated the claimed compound was an average performer on crops other than corn and soybean.). See also Ex parte A, 17 USPQ2d 1716 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (unexpected superior therapeutic activity of claimed compound against anaerobic bacteria was sufficient to rebut prima facie obviousness even though there was no evidence that the compound was effective against all bacteria).

716.02(b) [R-2] Burden on Applicant

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>I. < BURDEN ON APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH RESULTS ARE UNEXPECTED AND SIGNIFICANT

The evidence relied *>upon< should establish “that the differences in results are in fact unexpected and unobvious and of both statistical and practical significance.” Ex parte Gelles, 22 USPQ2d 1318, 1319 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) (Mere conclusions in appellants’ brief that the claimed polymer had an unexpectedly increased impact strength “are not entitled to the weight of conclusions accompanying the evidence, either in the specification or in a declaration.”); Ex parte C, 27 USPQ2d 1492 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) (Applicant alleged unexpected results with regard to the claimed soybean plant, however there was no basis for judging the practical significance of data with regard to maturity date, flowering date, flower color, or height of the plant.). See also In re Nolan, 553 F.2d 1261, 1267, 193 USPQ 641, 645 (CCPA 1977) and In re Eli Lilly, 902 F.2d 943, 14 USPQ2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1990) as discussed in MPEP § 716.02(c).

>II. < APPLICANTS HAVE BURDEN OF EXPLAINING PROFFERED DATA

“[A]ppellants have the burden of explaining the data in any declaration they proffer as evidence of non-obviousness.” Ex parte Ishizaka, 24 USPQ2d 1621, 1624 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992).

>III. < DIRECT AND INDIRECT COMPARATIVE TESTS ARE PROBATIVE OF NONOBVIOUSNESS

Evidence of unexpected properties may be in the form of a direct or indirect comparison of the claimed invention with the closest prior art which is commensurate in scope with the claims. See In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 205 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1980) and MPEP § 716.02(d) - § 716.02(e). See In re Blondel, 499 F.2d 1311, 1317, 182 USPQ 294, 298 (CCPA 1974) and In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237, 1241-42, 169 USPQ 429, 433 (CCPA 1971) for examples of cases where indirect comparative testing was found sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. The patentability of an intermediate may be established by unexpected properties of an end product “when one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably ascribe to a claimed intermediate the contributing cause” for such an unexpectedly superior activity or property.” In re Magerlein, 602 F.2d 366, 373, 202 USPQ 473, 479 (CCPA 1979). “In order to establish that the claimed intermediate is a contributing cause’ of the unexpectedly superior activity or property of an end product, an applicant must identify the cause of the unexpectedly superior activity or property (compared to the prior art) in the end product and establish a nexus for that cause between the intermediate and the end product.” Id. at 479.

>II. < DEMONSTRATING CRITICALITY OF A CLAIMED RANGE

To establish unexpected results over a claimed range, applicants should compare a sufficient number of tests both inside and outside the claimed range to show the criticality of the claimed range. In re Hill, 284 F.2d 955, 128 USPQ 197 (CCPA 1960).

716.02(c) [R-2] Comparison With Closest Prior Art

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An affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.132 must compare the claimed subject matter with the closest prior art to be effective to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 201 USPQ 67 (CCPA 1979). “A comparison of the claimed invention with the disclosure of each cited reference to determine the number of claim limitations in common with each reference, bearing in mind the relative importance of particular limitations, will usually yield the closest single prior art reference.” In re Merchant, 575 F.2d 865, 868, 197 USPQ 785, 787 (CCPA 1978) (emphasis in original). Where the comparison is not identical with the reference disclosure, deviations therefrom should be explained. In re Finley, 174 F.2d 130, 81 USPQ 383 (CCPA 1949), and if not explained should be noted and evaluated, and if significant, explanation should be required. In re Armstrong, 280 F.2d 132, 126 USPQ 281 (CCPA 1960) (deviations from example were inconsequential).

>I. < THE CLAIMED INVENTION MAY BE COMPARED WITH PRIOR ART THAT IS CLOSER THAN THAT APPLIED BY THE EXAMINER

Applicants may compare the claimed invention with prior art that is more closely related to the invention than the prior art relied upon by the examiner. In re Holladay, 584 F.2d 384, 199 USPQ 516 (CCPA 1978); Ex parte Humber, 217 USPQ 265 (Bd. App. 1961) (Claims to a 13-chloro substituted compound were rejected as obvious over nonchlorinated analogs of the claimed compound. Evidence showing unexpected results for the claimed compound as compared with the 9-, 12-, and 14- chloro derivatives of the compound rebutted the prima facie case of obviousness because the compounds compared against were closer to the claimed invention than the prior art relied upon.).

>II. < COMPARISONS WHEN THERE ARE TWO EQUALLY CLOSE PRIOR ART REFERENCES

Showing unexpected results over one of two equally close prior art references will not rebut prima facie obviousness unless the teachings of the prior art references are sufficiently similar to each other that the testing of one showing unexpected results would provide the same information as to the other. In re Johnson, 747 F.2d 1456, 1461, 223 USPQ 1260, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Claimed compounds differed from the prior art either by the presence of a trifluoromethyl group instead of a chloride radical, or by the presence of an unsaturated ester group instead of a saturated ester group. Although applicant compared the claimed invention with the prior art compound containing a chloride radical, the court found this evidence insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness because the evidence did not show relative effectiveness over all compounds of the closest prior art. An applicant does not have to test all the compounds taught by each reference, “[h]owever, where an applicant tests less than all cited compounds, the test must be sufficient to permit a conclusion respecting the relative effectiveness of applicant’s claimed compounds and the compounds of the closest prior art.” Id. (quoting In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 316, 203 USPQ 245, 256 (CCPA 1979))(emphasis in original).).

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>III. < THE CLAIMED INVENTION MAY BE COMPARED WITH THE CLOSEST SUBJECT MATTER THAT EXISTS IN THE PRIOR ART

Although evidence of unexpected results must compare the claimed invention with the closest prior art, applicant is not required to compare the claimed invention with subject matter that does not exist in the prior art. In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 689, 2 USPQ2d 1276, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., concurring) (Evidence rebutted prima facie case by comparing claimed invention with the most relevant prior art. Note that the majority held the Office failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.); In re Chapman, 357 F.2d 418, 148 USPQ 711 (CCPA 1966) (Requiring applicant to compare claimed invention with polymer suggested by the combination of references relied upon in the rejection of the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. 103 “would be requiring comparison of the results of the invention with the results of the invention.” 357 F.2d at 422, 148 USPQ at 714.).

716.02(f) Advantages Disclosed or Inherent

The totality of the record must be considered when determining whether a claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Therefore, evidence and arguments directed to advantages not disclosed in the specification cannot be disregarded. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 298-99, 36 USPQ2d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Although the purported advantage of placement of a selective catalytic reduction catalyst in the bag retainer of an apparatus for controlling emissions was not disclosed in the specification, evidence and arguments rebutting the conclusion that such placement was a matter of “design choice” should have been considered as part of the totality of the record. “We have found no cases supporting the position that a patent applicant’s evidence or arguments traversing a § 103 rejection must be contained within the specification. There is no logical support for such a proposition as well, given that obviousness is determined by the totality of the record including, in some instances most significantly, the evidence and arguments proffered during the give-and-take of ex parte patent prosecution.” 66 F.3d at 299, 36 USPQ2d at 1095.). See also In re Zenitz, 333 F.2d 924, 928, 142 USPQ 158, 161 (CCPA 1964) (evidence that claimed compound minimized side effects of hypotensive activity must be considered because this undisclosed property would inherently flow from disclosed use as tranquilizer); Ex parte Sasajima, 212 USPQ 103, 104 - 05 (Bd. App. 1981) (evidence relating to initially undisclosed relative toxicity of claimed pharmaceutical compound must be considered). The specification need not disclose proportions or values as critical for applicants to present evidence showing the proportions or values to be critical. In re Saunders, 444 F.2d 599, 607, 170 USPQ 213, 220 (CCPA 1971).

716.02(g) Declaration or Affidavit Form

“The reason for requiring evidence in declaration or affidavit form is to obtain the assurances that any statements or representations made are correct, as provided by 35 U.S.C. 25 and 18 U.S.C. 1001.” Permitting a publication to substitute for expert testimony would circumvent the guarantees built into the statute. Ex parte Gray, 10 USPQ2d 1922, 1928 (Bd. Pat.

App. & Inter. 1989). Publications may, however, be evidence of the facts in issue and should be considered to the extent that they are probative.

5. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the **THREE-MONTH** shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than **SIX MONTHS** from the mailing date of this final action.

6. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Tri M. Mai whose telephone number is (703)308-1038. The examiner can normally be reached on 7:30am-5:00pm.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Lee W Young can be reached on (703)308-2572. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

/Tri M. Mai/
Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3781